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Introduction
This paper studies how country-speci…c policies respond to international market integration using a stylized model that de…nes a country in terms of imperfectly mobile factor endowments and of the political process that chooses the economic policies enforced within its boundaries, and focuses on how heterogeneous factor intensities jointly determine labor market policy and international mobility of capital.
Standard race-to-the-bottom intuition suggests that tighter integration increases the elasticity of market reactions to policies, and begets deregulation. When economic activity crosses the country's borders, however, beggar-thy-neighbor incentives also in ‡uence the politicoeconomic equilibrium policy. Bertola (2016) models labor policy motivated only by redistribution and shows that a transition from autarky to complete integration can imply reform and capital ‡ow patterns consistent with those observed in Europe's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In this more technical paper the laissez faire may be ine¢ cient, integration can be incomplete, and two modeling devices make it possible to obtain a richer and sharper set of results. Supposing that agents di¤er only in terms of factor endowments and ruling out lump-sum transfers lets structural imperfections and distributional motives interact simply as politico-economic determinants of policy choice. Supposing that international capital ‡ows are subject to proportional "iceberg" relocation costs lets international integration vary gradually. It can then be shown that, regardless of whether the domestic policy also addresses laissez faire market imperfections, tighter integration implies more stringent regulation if the country experiences capital in ‡ows, and deregulation if capital ‡ows out of the country. The model's structure and results, outlined in this introductory section, build on a variety of previous contributions. Section 2 sets up an economy where a ‡exible supply of labor is employed with capital, adopting the tractable functional forms introduced by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu¤man (1988) , and characterizes the individual welfare implications of the wedge between productivity and utility margins that in micro-founded macroeconomic models represent policy and market imperfections (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2007) . As in the Bertola (1993) model of factor income shares and savings and the Bertola (2004) model of labor policies that trade productivity o¤ consumption smoothing, the distortions that policy corrects or introduces have di¤erent welfare implications for agents endowed with di¤erent amounts of capital. Hence, the country's politico-economic equilibrium takes both aggregate e¢ ciency and distributional considerations into account (Meltzer and Richards, 1981) . Section 3 characterizes policy determination in autarky, supposing that the country's citizens own di¤erent proportions of a …xed aggregate stock of capital. Allowing relative factor intensity to di¤er also across the country's borders, Section 4 models imperfect integration with the rest of the world: foreign-owned domestic capital is less productive because of an "iceberg" transport cost parameter akin to that introduced by Samuelson (1954) and used by an abundant literature to model trade in goods, and by Martin and Rey (2000) to analyze the …nancial implications of international capital mobility. The resulting tractable formal framework delivers insights that are related to, but distinct from, those of the international policy competition literature (Wilson 1999 , Sinn 2003 , Keen and Konrad 2013 . Because the country is not in…nitesimally small, its policy can in ‡uence equilibrium factor prices and the international allocation of capital, and politico-economic incentives to do so depend on the degree of international integration. Policy reduces employment if the politically decisive agent is realistically capital-poor. Then, smaller international wedges are associated with deregulation if capital ‡ows out of the country, but with tighter regulation if the country experiences capital in ‡ows. Section 5 considers technical issues arising in the transition from autarky to non-zero capital ‡ows and illustrates how the model's novel framework relates to previous work that, comparing only the limit cases of autarky and full integration, overstates the importance of race-to-the-bottom deregulation e¤ects. Section 6 builds on this analysis to characterize welfare implications: tighter integration is necessarily bene…cial for the average individual in perfectly competitive markets, but can be welfare-reducing on average if it weakens corrective policies, and for non-average decisive individuals damaged by integration's factor-price and domestic policy implications. Section 7 concludes discussing how the model and possible extensions may help interpret real-life integration experiences.
A model of labor allocation
Welfare increases in consumption of market goods which, in a static setting, coincides with the income rk i + wl i of an individual who brings k i units of capital and l i units of labor to a factor market where units of these factors sell for r and w. Welfare declines in the amount of labor supplied to the market, accounting for the welfare contribution of leisure, or of activities that do not use the market's capital.
It greatly simpli…es derivation and interpretation of the results to suppose that for all i preferences have the same quasi-linear form
with B 0 (l) > 0 and B 00 (l) 0, so that the …rst-order condition w = B 0 (l) identi…es the same optimal l i = l for all wage-taking individual. Heterogeneous nonlinear wealth e¤ects would make it impossible to characterize explicitly macroeconomic relationships between factor prices and aggregate factor supplies. As in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu¤man (1988) and other real business cycle models, functional form (1) rules income e¤ects. This implies an increasing relationship between l and w that is not realistic along the individual intensive margin; in the context of this and other macro models, B(l) refers to both intensive and extensive labor supply by unitary households that can transfer utility among their members:
ruling out such transfers across households rationalizes distortionary policies in politicoeconomic equilibrium.
Production has constant returns as a function of all marketed factors. 1 Denote per capita production y(al=k d )k d where l is labor supply and k d capital use (both per capita) and a indexes total factor productivity. Labor's unit income,
deviates from its social marginal productivity y 0 (al=k d )a if 6 = 1. Parameter indexes a distortion that shifts income across factors, while drives a wedge between labor's marginal 1 Because there are only two factors, higher l increases k's marginal productivity. For some purposes, such as the study of migration, it would be appropriate to allow for multiple factors and accommodate substitutability.
productivity and private bene…ts but does not directly in ‡uence unit capital income at given
Thus, the total income of an agent (individual, or household) who earns income from k i units of capital and a proportion l i of one unit of labor is
and depends on aggregate l according to 2
where
In what follows, capital's employment elasticity will depend on international market integration, and will be treated as a constant technological parameter. 3
The …rst-order condition for maximization of c (l i ; k i ; al=k d ) B(l i ) with respect to l,
identi…es the l that maximizes the welfare expression (1). Using the wage expression (2) it 2 This expression follows from
3 The results are locally valid for functional forms with variable elasticity and the usual properties.
It can be helpful to note that writing y(
and collecting terms in (4) yields
however the derivations below are easier to type and interpret in terms of generic functions.
can be written in the form !w = B 0 (l) where
is the proportional wedge that agent i's preferred labor allocation inserts between the market wage and B 0 (l), the marginal opportunity cost of market work. 4 To interpret this expression suppose …rst that k i = 0. For an agent who only draws income from labor, the wedge only includes the second square bracket on the right-hand side of (6).
If (1 k ) > 0, variation of l changes factor prices along a downward-sloping labor demand schedule. Starting from the laissez faire allocation, labor surplus increases if l declines, and is maximal when the wage exceeds the opportunity cost of labor supply by the monopolistic
(1 (1 k ) ) 1 proportional markup. This is dubbed a "monopoly union" e¤ect in what follows.
If k i > 0, then the welfare of agent i also depends on how l in ‡uences capital income in (3). Higher l increases production by y 0 (al=k d )a = w= ( ). In the absence of distortions capital would be paid a share of that marginal increase. When the marginal share of capital is 1 (1 ), and the portion of it that is paid to units owned by agent i is diluted by a proportional increase k of total capital, then
The …rst square bracket on the right-hand side of (6) accounts for k i units of this marginal income when computing higher l's impact on agent i's income. What follows refers to this as an "ownership e¤ect".
Structural distortions
It will simplify typography and interpretation below to summarize the role of and with
which equals unity if = = 1. 5 Using (7) in (6), the proportional wedge
satis…es the …rst-order condition for maximization of agent i's income. 6 If mk i =k d = 1, then ! = 1: the wage (2) corresponds to the e¤ect of l on agent i's total income and consumption, and the welfare-maximizing l equates it to the marginal opportunity cost B 0 (l) of market work. If mk i =k d 6 = 1 instead, then the total income implications of l di¤er from the wage in ways that depend on the economy's structure and individual factor ownership.
The deviations from unity of and/or that may imply m 6 = 1 represent market distortions. In an economy where 6 = 1 drives a wedge between marginal productivity and the wage, or between marginal cost and price, labor's income share
di¤ers from what would be determined by marginal productivity in perfectly competitive markets. This can be implied by pricing power in factor or product markets, from such externalities as market thickness in search and matching environments, and other market imperfections. Because dm=d = ( ) 2 ( ) 1 < 0, the preferred wedge expression (8) is larger for a smaller : all else equal, policy should boost employment more strongly if labor is paid increasingly less than marginal product.
Parameter represents a related but distinct type of distortion. If < 1, then work contributes to worker's welfare less than to production: if market employment entails idiosyncratic yet uninsurable risk, for example, then labor supplied on a risk-adjusted basis falls short of the marginal productivity paid by competitive employers who can diversify the income of each unit of capital. Because dm=d = m= < 0, the policy wedge (8) is larger when is smaller, and higher employment has more positive total income e¤ects.
5 It can be helpful to see that, using (7), the explicit income expression of footnote 3 reads
The …rst-order condition may alternatively and equivalently be taken with respect to speci…c policy instruments or, as in Bertola (2016) , to the ! wedge.
Policy and politics
In the model economy all individuals are identical except for their relative wealth k i . This makes it straightforward to see how collectively chosen and enforced policies may obtain an allocation with ! 6 = 1 with taxes and subsidies, or with wage or quantity constraints. 7 A payroll tax or subsidy at rate 1 ! does insert a wedge between labor's marginal product and alternative use, and has the welfare implications modeled above if its revenue or cost is shared equally across individuals who, as assumed, have identical preferences and labor endowments. In this case there is no unemployment, because the agent-level optimality condition equates net wages to B 0 (l) and coincides with the policy optimality condition.
If the policy is enforced by a minimum wage that exceeds by a proportion 1=! the marketclearing wage, individual …rst-order conditions are slack, and denoting with 1= labor supply's wage elasticity the resulting unemployment rate 1 l=l s log ! 1=
(1 !) = has the welfare implications characterized above if (as in Merz 1995 , Andolfatto 1996 , and other real business cycle models) households can transfer utility among their employed and unemployed members. Quantity constraints (such as working time limits, minimum annual vacations, or mandatory retirement) have the same welfare implications as the wedge they introduce between demand and supply. 8
From the point of view of a planner interested in maximizing average welfare, market imperfections may motivate "active" measures that imply ! > 1 and increase l above its laissez faire. If m > 1 indicates that the private reward of labor market participation is lower than its social productivity, subsidizing employment increases average e¢ ciency. The arguments just made and expression (8) however show that agents with di¤erent income sources have di¤erent views as to whether and how structural problems should be targeted by policy. The factor price e¤ect of higher employment, in the absence of compensatory 7 It is possible to model some features of a more complicated reality. If not only wealth but also the number of labor units n i di¤er across households, policy preferences depend on k i = (n i k d ) and n i dl i =dl.
Most qualitative insights remain valid, but there would be heterogeneous and possibly discontinuous policy e¤ects (working hour limitations, for example, may or may not be binding for speci…c agents). 8 Job security provisions in models of uninsurable labor income risk and well-diversi…ed capital income (Bertola, 2004) and active labor market policies in search-and-matching models have steadystate distributional implications that are qualitatively similar to those of this static wedge.
transfers, bene…t owners of complementary capital. So the smaller is k i , the less relevant are the structural imperfections that imply a larger m are less relevant to individual i's preferred policy wedge (8).
Because individuals with di¤erent k i prefer di¤erent wedges, it is necessary to specify a political decision mechanism. It is simplest to suppose that the preferences of a decisive agent who owns a fraction x of the economy's per capita capital determine the country's policy. 9 Then, the politico-economic equilibrium policy wedge is given by expression (8) with k i = xk,
The product mx indexes the joint and similar roles of structural imperfections and distributional considerations in determining the optimal l from the decisive agent's point of view, and the policy instruments that enforce it in equilibrium. Parameter x would be irrelevant to policy determination if lump-sum transfers could o¤set the welfare implications of factorprice changes. Because policy-makers cannot transfer utility across heterogeneous agents, policy reduces average welfare in order to in ‡uence its distribution, and x plays the same policy-shaping role as m, and as the inverse of the structural wedge : increasing employment above its laissez faire level is bene…cial for the average individual if in laissez faire labor earns less than its marginal contribution (but capital does get an appropriate share), and is even more attractive for a relatively wealthy decisive agent who disproportionately gains from the higher productivity of the complementary capital she owns. As long as mx > 0, policy preferences internalize some of the positive implications of employment for capital income, and the "ownership e¤ect" exerts a positive in ‡uence on the policy wedge and on the resulting l. However the wedge exceeds unity, and l is larger than in laissez faire, only if mx > 1.
The distinction between market imperfections and policies is not as sharp in reality as in the model. For example, the wage-setting power of unionized labor is something that would call for corrective policies from the social point of view. Without compensatory lump-sum transfers, however, it is problematic to correct market imperfections that have distributional 9 An alternative policy determination framework would assign di¤erent social welfare weights to agents that are more or well endowed with capital. This would have qualitatively similar implications, but require a complete speci…cation of factor endowments'distribution.
implications. Just like it would be politically awkward to subsidize a natural monopolist in order to maximize aggregate production, so there can be sound political rationales for policies, such as right-to-strike legislation, that strengthen rather than reduce labor market distortions.
Closed economy
This and the next sections inspect and interpret the economy's politico-economic equilibrium.
It is useful …rst to illustrate the mechanisms at work when the policy's determination and e¤ects take place in an economy with a given amount k d = k of locally owned capital. With = 0 and k i = xk, the wedge expression (8) reads
and has a simple and intuitive interpretation. Labor earns a share 1 of the income produced by higher l, so if policy re ‡ected only the "monopoly union" e¤ect then the wage would be marked up above marginal productivity by a proportion 1= (1 ). Because individuals who own capital also partake of the complementary income fraction , the "ownership e¤ect" o¤sets this exactly if mx = 1: this is the case when x = m = 1 and policy suits the average individual of an undistorted market economy, and also when each of x and m di¤ers from one but there is no political support for correction of laissez faire distortions. It is instructive to inspect the optimal wedge when x = 1 but m 6 = 1. If = 1, then with m = (1 ) = expression (9) yields ! = , so that labor is paid according to its marginal productivity. If = 1, then ! = 1 + (1 ) = > 1 rewards labor more than the laissez faire wage would, and internalizes to labor supply choices their contribution to capital income. Figure 1 illustrates the economy's equilibrium for various values of x and a roughly realistic set of other parameters. The function that tallies the welfare loss in income-equivalent units from allocation of each agent's labor unit to production of marketable output has the constant elasticity form
In the …gure, if x = 1 then the policy wedge corrects fully the imperfections represented by Because wealth is more unequal than labor income, however, it is natural to suppose that x < 1 when the decisive agent is the median voter in a democratic policy determination process. In reality, labor income is taxed and non-employment subsidized, and collective contracts or laws impose minimum rather than maximum wages, and upper rather than lower bounds on working time. Such "passive" policies enforce ! < 1 and reduce the market's labor intensity. By (9), this is the model's equilibrium outcome, even when m > 1, if x is su¢ ciently below unity to imply mx < 1. The illustrations and derivations here and below focus on this case and do not always explicitly discuss the symmetric and less plausible implications of mx > 1.
For the parameters used in Figure 1 , x =80% more than fully o¤sets "active" labor policy motives, and implies a 10% wage tax instead of the similar employment subsidy favored by the average individual. Lower values of x further reduce employment in the …gure. It is easy to see in (9) that as x ! 0 the distortions that shape capital income become irrelevant to policy determination and the wedge ! approaches 1 for any m, enforcing the proportional wage mark-up that would be chosen by an economy-wide monopoly union's disregard of all non-labor income.
In the reality that the model means to represent, "passive" labor policy serves the interests of agents who are not as wealthy as the economy's average. The shortfall below unity of the model's x depends on the extent and persistence of wealth inequality, as well as on the role of wealth in shaping political power. Like the structural features summarized by m also the political characteristics summarized by x depend on the country's culture and history, and are taken as given as the paper proceeds to study how they interact with international economic integration in determining policy.
Partial integration
Suppose it is possible for capital to be employed across the country's borders, but units of foreign-owned capital contribute less than those of the national stock k to the domestic capital stock k d . Parameter 1 indexes the intensity of this phenomenon: when = 1 capital that crosses country boundaries remains equally productive, representing perfect and complete market integration; < 1 implies proportionally lower productivity, representing the contractual problems, capital controls, and taxes that in reality imply less than complete market integration. The rest-of-the-world economy has …nite size and functions in much the same way as the model country's, with the same elasticity and A, L, and K in the same role as the corresponding lower-case symbols introduced above. 10 If k d > k, then the rest of the world employs a stock K (k d k) = of capital, with marginal productivity
The model's country employs only its national capital stock if is small (and certainly 10 While k and l are measured in per-capita terms, K and L are proportional to the rest of the world's relative population. It would be possible, if cumbersome, to let L depend on other countries' policy choices. if = 0). In this section is taken to be large enough to allow at least some international investment. Because a marginal unit of foreign capital is equivalent to only < 1 units of the domestic capital stock, marginal productivities are equalized at
by
which exceeds k if k=al < 1 1
K=AL.
It will ease typography and interpretation below to de…ne ( ; al; AL) al When k 6 = k d , the interior optimality condition that yields expression (6) for the proportional wedge between l's marginal market productivity and non-market utility can be written
The brackets in the second line identify the "ownership" and "monopoly" e¤ects. The third line recognizes from (11) and (12) that xk=k d = xk = and = 1 . International market integration implies a more positive , which lets domestic capital earn a larger share of the marginal income produced by higher l, but also implies that more of it is paid to foreigners. In a partially-integrated economy, the political and structural features summarized by x and m interact not only with each other, as in (9), but also with and , which have straightforward interpretations and play intuitive roles in determining the policy wedge. Expression is the country's share of an e¤ective total employment measure that adjusts the foreign component by the power of implied by the market equilibrium condition (11). In the policy wedge, a larger associates variation of l with a smaller proportional capital variation to maintain equality in (11), and strengthens the "monopoly union" e¤ect. Expression is the country's share of the e¤ective capital that is potentially available for domestic production. In the policy wedge, a larger implies a smaller spillover to foreigners, and strengthens the "ownership e¤ect".
In a closed economy, = = 1 and (13) coincides with (9). At the other extreme, when = = 0 the country is so small as to make its capital ‡ows irrelevant to the outside world's economy: hence, ! = 1, because domestic policy cannot and does not in ‡uence factor prices.
In more realistic intermediate cases, tighter integration has unambiguous implications for the wedge (13): in a capital-importing country, 11
so tighter integration implies a more "passive" policy. As shown in Figure 2 , which uses the same functional forms and parameters as Figure 1 , tighter international integration increase employment along the labor supply curve as larger capital in ‡ows increase labor demand, but less than they would if labor policy were not reformed in the direction of stronger taxation and/or stricter wage and quantity constraints.
11 This uses the derivatives To see why, consider the decisive individual's incentives to distort l when k d > k. The "ownership" e¤ect is weaker when some domestic capital income is paid to foreigners, and tighter integration weakens it further: the decisive agent is all the more inclined to choose policies that decrease l below its laissez faire level if a larger reduces the country's share of the partially integrated market that supplies some of its capital. As to the "monopoly union" e¤ect, incentives to reduce employment in a partially integrated country are weaker than in a closed economy when < 1 ‡attens the resulting wage increase: but if k d > k a larger increases a capital-importing country's e¤ective share of the partially integrated market, and lets its policy exert a stronger in ‡uence on equilibrium marginal productivities.
For both reasons, in a capital-importing country a larger is associated with a smaller ! wedge, and a more "passive" labor policy.
Because the country's policy-maker disregards foreign welfare, familiar beggar-thy-neighbor motives are at work. From the rest of the world's point of view, policy moves too much towards regulation in response to capital in ‡ows, because the welfare implications of a lower l are positive for individuals who own immobile labor, and qualitatively similar to those of capital income taxes rebated to local citizens in standard models of policy competition (Wilson 1999, p.279) .
If k d < k, tighter integration symmetrically increases the (13) policy wedge. 12 The interpretation is also fully symmetric. In a capital-out ‡ow country, the strength of the "monopoly union" e¤ect depends on , which falls further below unity when a larger increases its capital's productivity abroad and makes it easier for capital ‡ows to react to country-speci…c policies. And beggar-thy-neighbor policy motives strengthen the "ownership" e¤ect: for the decisive agent, a higher l is a way to retain capital and support national rather than foreign labor incomes, and there is no reason to consider deregulation's negative welfare implications abroad.
From autarky to full integration
The linear functional form of international market frictions yields a neat characterization of interactions between capital ‡ows and policy. As shown above, stronger capital in ‡ows are locally associated with more regulation, and stronger out ‡ows with less regulation, when both capital stocks and policy satisfy interior equilibrium conditions. The model however also features corner solutions and discontinuities, characterized in this section, that while technically intricate do provide insights into the relationship between the model's implications and those of models that only allow for autarky or full integration.
In deriving and interpreting analytical results it will be useful to refer to the numerical solutions shown in Figure 3 , which use the constant-elasticity labor supply speci…cation (10) and most of the same parameters as in previous …gures, but consider four di¤erent con…gu-rations of the model country's relative capital intensity and politico-economic structure. In each panel of the …gure, the relationship between the variable on the vertical axis and the partial-integration wedge is shown by continuous lines if the country is capital-poor relative to the rest of the world, by dashed lines if it is instead potentially integrated with a 12 Recognizing that when the country experiences capital out ‡ows 1= replaces in (12), and differentiating as in footnote 11,
Figure 3: Implications of integration for capital mobility, policy wedges, and employment in four di¤erent countries.
relatively capital-poor foreign economy. The numerical exercise considers two such pairs of countries, which di¤er along a dimension of particular interest. In the left-hand column of panels mx < 1, so labor policy maximizes a relatively poor decisive agent's welfare and tends to drive l below its laissez faire level. In the right-hand panels, mx > 1, and laissez faire distortions motivate policy to increase l instead.
The top panels of Figure 3 display the proportional excess of domestic capital over the nationally owned stock. In the regions where this is not zero, and k d 6 = k, the numerical solution satis…es the …rst order condition (13). In the second panel from the top (where the axis is drawn at the ! = 1 laissez faire level), as analytically shown above, the policy wedge moves opposite to the capital ‡ows ampli…ed by better …nancial integration. In the next panel down, as in Figure 2 , l moves in the same direction as domestic capital, but less than it would if ! did not change.
Incipient integration
The country's capital intensity does not di¤er from the rest of the world's so much as to trigger either in ‡ows or out ‡ows of capital, and condition (11) is slack, if
where the endogenous variable l depends on policy. To ease comparisons the parameters used in the …gure always imply the same autarky l A , and the K=k to AL= (al A ) ratio is 1=(1 ) for the country represented by continuous lines, 1=(1 ) for that represented by dashed lines.
Thus, for l = l A one of the inequalities in (14) becomes an equality at the same value of (set to 0:75 in the …gure).
In the left-most portions of Figure 3 's horizontal axis is small enough to prevent capital ‡ows, so the wedge (9) is the same across countries in each panel (lower than unity in the left-hand side mx < 1 panels, larger in the right-hand panels where mx < 1). As becomes larger, the transition to the partial-integration wedge (13) is very di¤erent for countries that experience capital in ‡ows and out ‡ows.
To see why, note that the decisive agent's welfare is the upper envelope of the values of (1) conditional on no capital ‡ows and on active capital ‡ows. Varying l changes the (11), and the …rst-order condition that yields (13) cannot identify the optimal policy when
To characterize the model's implication at and around the points identi…ed by (15) it is helpful to refer to Figure (4) , which plots the decisive agent's welfare as a function of employment for various values for the two countries considered in the left-hand panels of Figure 3 . With mx < 1 welfare is more positively in ‡uenced by l when capital does ‡ow than in autarky: because the decisive agent's welfare weighs labor more than capital, it grows more if a higher l attracts capital and increases the wage relative to capital income, as in the top panel of Figure 4 . The decisive agent welcomes capital in ‡ows, so l optimally jumps to the maximum of the active- ‡ows welfare function as soon as allows the latter to exceeds the maximum of the closed-economy welfare function (both of which satisfy …rst-order conditions). This occurs when is still below the value that would trigger capital in ‡ows at the autarky employment level l A , because capital mobility triggers deregulation:
in Figure 3 , both ! and l increase discretely as soon as capital begins to ‡ow.
Symmetrically, welfare declines more if a smaller l accelerates capital out ‡ows which with mx < 1, reduce the decisive agent's income and welfare. The bottom panel of Figure 4 illustrates this case. At the autarky employment l A , capital would begin to ‡ow out as soon as grows to the 0:75 critical value. As long as the closed-economy welfare function at some l exceeds the maximum of the integrated welfare, however, it is optimal to deregulate just enough to retain capital: the wedge that implements this corner solution places l at a kink of the upper envelope welfare function, where neither the autarky nor the partial-integration …rst-order condition hold. This reduces but cannot reverse the factor-price implications of tighter integration: in Figure 3 , l increases and welfare declines smoothly in before capital begins to ‡ow.
In the left-hand side panels of Figure 3 , policy jumps as soon as in ‡ows become positive, and moves gradually to smother incipient in ‡ows. To interpret these transitions it is helpful to recall how the "ownership e¤ect" shapes policy in the model. If the incipient ‡ow is incoming, discrete deregulation lets it boost a capital poor decisive agent's income as soon as is large enough to let capital ‡ow at the resulting level of l. If instead the incipient ‡ow is outgoing, it is better to keep employment just high enough to retain capital, and preserve its contribution to the immobile decisive agent's income. In the right-hand panels of Figure 3 , where mx < 1 and the decisive agent prefers l to be higher than in laissez faire, capital out ‡ows are bene…cial, capital in ‡ows are damaging, and transitions out of autarky are symmetric to those in Figure 4 .
This reasoning also explains why ! moves towards unity when capital begins to ‡ow. At k d = k the "ownership e¤ect" remains unchanged, but incipient capital mobility weakens the "monopoly union" e¤ect. Thus, any transition out of autarky triggers deregulation. This race-to-the-bottom mechanism operates in the transitions discussed above and illustrated in Figure 4 , not more generally: as tends to unity, in a country that imports capital and implements a "passive" policy tighter integration induces stronger rather than looser regulation.
Full integration
Consider next the = 1 limit case. 13 If capital ‡ows freely across the country's borders, labor demand is more elastic than in autarky, as (1; al; AL) = al= (al + AL) < 1. The resulting weaker "monopoly union" e¤ect implies a race-to-the-bottom tendency towards ! = 1 which is stronger in a smaller country but, as long as > 0, can be more than fully o¤set by the "ownership" e¤ect.
To see this, note that = al= (al + AL) and = k= (k + K) in (13) yield a policy wedge
that is larger than its closed-economy counterpart (9) if
In words, when ! > 1 then policy is even more "active" in perfect integration if the country's politico-economic index mx > 1 exceeds the rest of the world's relative labor intensity. Symmetrically, as shown in Bertola (2016) , capital-poor countries may implement more "passive" policies within integrated economies than they would in autarky: if mx < 1, then ! falls further below unity if the inequality in (16) is reversed.
Two of the four numerical exercises of Figure 3 illustrate this analytical result. In the lefthand side panels, where mx < 1 implies a "passive" policy, the wedge grows towards unity as begins to allow capital in ‡ows, then moves in the opposite direction, and eventually exceeds its autarky level. Symmetrically, in the right-hand side panels both wedges initially fall towards unity, but the relatively capital-rich country's thereafter moves in the opposite direction, and eventually supports employment more than in autarky.
Welfare
The model's constant international wedge o¤ers a simple characterization of partial and variable integration, but complicates the previous section's characterization of the transition between the two situations, and implies an excessively dramatic contrast between zero and even very small capital ‡ows. 14 The welfare e¤ects that shape such transitions, however, are interestingly similar to those at work in the more realistic and tractable situations where capital ‡ows and policy continuously react to gradual variation of international integration.
In Figure 5 continuous and dashed lines show numerical solutions for the decisive agent's welfare in the same four countries as in Figure 3 . Because the decisive agent's welfare is always maximized by changing policy choices, the envelope theorem removes the …rst-order 14 It might however be realistic for a capital-importing country with mx < 1 to experience a step increase of capital and discrete reforms, reminiscent of a double Big Bang liberalization of both crossborder (…nancial) and internal (labor) markets.
welfare e¤ect through l of variation and makes it easy to characterize analytically the slope of the lines plotted in Figure 5 .
By (1) and (4) at k i = xk, the decisive-agent welfare e¤ect of is
The term dk d =d captures the capital ‡ow implications of the tighter integration represented by a larger . As integration strengthens capital movements, its e¤ect on k d is positive if easier capital mobility makes the country's domestic capital grow further above its national stock, negative if increases foreign employment of national capital. 15 . Using steps similar to those outlined in footnote 2 and the de…nitions of and m yields
The welfare e¤ect (17) is positive, and tighter integration bene…ts the decisive agent, if implies in (13) that a "passive" ! < 1 policy tends to reduce l below its laissez faire level: in Figure 5 , the U-shaped lines begin to increase at the same degree of integration where ! 1 crosses the horizontal axis in Figure 3 .
The mechanism underlying this neat result deserves a brief discussion. Because a larger domestic capital stock increases the wage and decreases capital's unit income, (18) may be positive or negative. The two e¤ects cancel out when kmx = k d , and in particular when 15 Di¤erentiation of the expressions in (12) yields x = m = 1 and k = k d : the welfare of a representative agent who owns all of the economy's capital remains unchanged (to …rst order) if employment adjusts optimally to factor prices (as mx tends to unity from below, the top and bottom panels of Figure 4 converge to each other, and so would their mirror images if mx converged to unity from above). When kmx 6 = k d , the sign of (18) depends on whether mx is larger or smaller than k d =k, which also determines how the (13) policy wedge deviates from unity. To see why, note that a small mx means that the decisive agent's welfare depends more strongly on labor than on capital income: this implies that ! < 1 enforces a "passive" policy, and lets the wage implications of k d determine the sign of (18).
Because k d =k < 1 in a capital-importing country and k d =k > 1 in a capital-exporting country, tighter integration is certainly bene…cial for the decisive agent if mx = 1 and no policy is enforced (either because there are no distortions and policy aims to aggregate ef…ciency, or because distortions suit the decisive agent). This follows directly from the fact that competitive equilibrium is in the "core" of an exchange economy: just like secession of a group of individuals cannot make them all better o¤ on their own, so economic integration in a wider market cannot reduce average country welfare in laissez faire. But integration can damage groups of heterogeneous agents if lump-sum transfers are ruled out, as they must be to understand why policy distorts markets away from the allocation that maximizes aggregate welfare.
The decisive agent's welfare is particularly interesting because policies may determine the international wedge as well as the internal market wedge !. Reforms partly o¤set the capital ‡ow implications of integration, but do not change their sign, or that of its welfare implications. If mx < 1 rationalizes realistic "passive" policies, the tighter integration represented by a larger certainly increases the decisive agent's welfare if capital ‡ows in, but can very well reduce it if capital ‡ows out (or if l is set at the minimal level that prevents capital out ‡ows). For a decisive agent who prefers to distort employment below its laissez faire level, for stronger capital out ‡ows to be welfare-improving that agent must be close enough to average to introduce only a small ! wedge, and experience a positive welfare e¤ect.
The numerical computations shown in Figure 6 use most of the same parameters as it optimal to distort l upwards with "active" policies.
The lowest line in the …gure shows that such "active" policy action is weaker when its e¤ects spill over to foreign owners of capital, and that tighter integration decreases the welfare of an average decisive individual through familiar race-to-the-bottom e¤ects. The lines that illustrate welfare e¤ects for decisive agents with x < 1 are U-shaped: race-to-the-bottom deregulation is damaging when capital ‡ows are small, but further integration has positive welfare implications once the foreign-owned portion of domestic capital has become large enough to let beggar-thy-neighbor motives make it optimal to distort l downwards. The thicker line at x = 0:80 con…rms that if mx = 1 makes laissez faire optimal in autarky, then integration always increases welfare. The lines above it show that, in this capital-importing country, integration's welfare e¤ects are more strongly positive when poorer decisive agents bene…t from more intense capital in ‡ows and more "passive" policy. 16 These welfare e¤ects could be characterized in more detail, if tediously, and not in closed form outside the laissez faire or autarky special cases. It is more interesting to note that the income, production, and welfare impacts of integration are in general comparable to those of the model country's structural and political features. If a decisive agent whose wealth di¤ers from average prefers policies that imply a certain variation of a closed economy's capital intensity, then that deviation from average can o¤set or double the welfare implications of capital ‡ows that induce that variation of domestic capital intensity. As in Figure 1 , a 30%
deviation of x from unity can justify a change of l and labor intensity in the order of 10%, which can also be implied by international integration if it results in imbalances and crossborder capital-income payments that, as a proportion of income and production, appear unusually large across countries (if not within politically uni…ed countries, where households routinely own or owe large multiples of their annual income).
In Figure 6 , welfare e¤ects range through only about 3 percentage points as the country moves from autarky to full integration with a much more capital-intensive rest of the world, experiencing the much more dramatic capital in ‡ow, employment, and policy e¤ects shown in Figure 5 . Welfare gains or losses only reach about 2% even as domestic capital and employment increase by some 30% and 10% respectively (and production grows by about 20% as a result). The parameters used in these …gure are meant to be only very roughly realistic, but these computations illustrate a fully general insight: welfare changes are smaller by an order of magnitude than those of domestic employment and production, because they net out similar but symmetric changes of foregone leisure and capital income payments. 16 Within the country, agents whose wealth di¤ers from xk experience similarly shaped and potentially much larger welfare changes. Characterizing how welfare e¤ects depend on variation of factor prices and policy reforms is conceptually straightforward but rather cumbersome. Bertola (2016) uses a simple two-classes numerical example to illustrate how welfare e¤ects di¤er in sign and size across the country's population on transition from autarky to full integration. To the extent that policy tends to reduce employment and production also and perhaps especially in wealthy countries, however, the model's politico-economic mechanism cannot explain integration as an endogenous phenomenon. When mx < 1 everywhere, then tighter integration can generate bene…cial capital in ‡ows for poor countries' decisive agents only as the counterpart of damaging capital out ‡ows for the relatively poor decisive agents of rich countries. Economic integration in history was rarely the result of democratic decision processes, and most often forced by conquest (Findlay and O'Rourke, 2009 ). For market integration to be politically acceptable in all countries, it has to imply favorable non-economic implications. The European experience is a case in point. Tighter integration should in theory and did in the early stages of EMU increase inequality and trigger labor policy deregulation in capital-rich countries (such as Germany), but non-economic motives (such as obtaining other countries'agreement for German reuni…cation) could make this politically acceptable.
Relevance and extensions
Because the plausible size of economic welfare e¤ects is rather small, non-economic motives need not be very strong to make integration politically acceptable, and their ‡uctuations can help interpret patterns of reforms and …nancial disintegration after the crisis (Bertola, 2017) .
As in any rational equilibrium model, agents do not need to be aware of the whole structure of the economy to behave as they do in equilibrium. Within the model, investors respond to pro…t opportunities, and policy-makers and voters react to labor market performances.
Authors and readers of academic papers can and should take a broader view of the issues, and see whether and how policy coordination may prevent excessive regulation and deregulation by policy-makers who disregard the interests of foreigners. Subsidiary labor policies distort capital movements like a source-basis capital income tax. From the point of view of an average individual, they have the same harmful implications of trade tari¤s, industrial subsidies, and other policies that are the European Union regulates at the supranational level. Labor policy coordination would be unanimously preferable to competition if it were possible to aggregate a country's welfare to what is experienced by a representative citizen, and in each country policy-makers served that citizen's interests. When instead policy-makers do not represent the country's average individual, then coordination is bene…cial "if and only if the elasticity of the tax base exceeds the policymaker's marginal propensity to waste tax revenue" (Edwards and Keen, 1996) . From the points of view of heterogeneous agents within each country, "waste"
is whatever damages them, even as it bene…ts others. Hence, subsets of each country's population may welcome market integration as a check on the power of policy-makers who to them look like a Leviathan. In principle, policies that compromise among con ‡icting interests in each country could be coordinated upon integration so as to please at least those who wield political power in their own countries. In practice, this would plausibly require cross-border transfers: to make tighter integration politically acceptable, payments would need to ‡ow from the middle-class decisive agents of capital-poor countries to those of capital-rich countries in times of increasing integration, and in the opposite direction when integration becomes more di¢ cult.
The present paper models market integration in terms of capital mobility and focuses on the factor price e¤ects of ‡exible employment in a single-good economy. Further research may explore the results'relevance and robustness in other settings. The distributional implications of external tari¤s or internal taxes in a two-sector economy at given aggregate factor supplies are similar to those studied here (Mayer, 1984) , and depend on country size (Syropoulos, 2002) as in the derivations above and in the policy competition literature. A more complex and realistic model of international integration or disintegration could account for public goods and income level redistribution (Bolton and Roland, 1997) alongside policies that in ‡uence factor allocation and prices. Allowing for capital accumulation over time would let not only labor but also investment and savings policy wedges (as in Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2013) determine the welfare of heterogeneously wealthy individuals (as in Bertola, 1992) . The optimal capital income taxation literature suggests that a capital-accumulating economy tends to completely deregulate labor markets in steady state. Imperfect intertemporal …nancial market integration would remove this somewhat implausible implication, and play a role similar to that of this paper's international wedge in shaping politico-economic interactions.
